[1.0.x] Webform Leet Speak Filter

Code review at commit fa42b93. Full manual read of all files, phpcs (Drupal + DrupalPractice), and — because the normalizer class is dependency-free — I executed it directly, so every behavioural claim below is verified rather than inferred.

Verdict up front

The core matching algorithm is broken in both directions: it blocks everyday innocent input with the module's own shipped default configuration, and it fails to catch the evasions the project description advertises. Verified by running LeetspeakNormalizer:

• "as soon as possible" with bad word ass → BLOCKED (both normalize to as)
• "meeting at 45" with ass → BLOCKED (4→a, 5→s, so "45" → as)
• "contact bob" with boob → BLOCKED (repeat-collapse turns "boob" into "bob")
• "hello :) how are you" with バカ → BLOCKED (both normalize to the empty string)
• "f*ck this" with fuck → passes — the advertised example is not caught (* is stripped, "fck" ≠ "fuck")
• "a** hole" with ass → passes — the settings form's own help table claims this is caught

The default config ships ass in the word list with real-time JS enabled, so out of the box any webform user typing "as" or "45" gets an error.

Major issues

1. Repeated-character collapse creates systematic false positives. normalize() collapses all repeated letters to one (ass→as, boob→bob), so every bad word with double letters equals a shorter innocent word; digit mapping makes number tokens match too. The v→u mapping mangles ordinary words ("love"→"loue"). Consider collapsing runs of 3+ to 2 (catches elongation without merging legitimate doubles), applying digit/symbol maps only inside mixed alphanumeric tokens, and testing against a corpus of innocent text.
2. The multilingual feature does not work. normalize() strips everything outside [a-z], so non-Latin lists (the form's own examples: ja|バカ, ar|كلب) normalize to ''. The server-side findBadWord() lacks the empty-string guard the JS has, so a configured Japanese/Arabic word never matches its real occurrence and instead matches any punctuation-only token (":)" triggers a block).
3. The JS applies to every webform on the site. hook_webform_submission_form_alter() only checks the global enable_js_realtime toggle (default TRUE) and never checks whether the webform has this handler attached. Client-side blocking (including a submit guard) is enforced on all webforms while server-side validation runs only where the handler exists — JS users are hard-blocked on forms never configured for filtering; JS-off users pass on the same forms. The hook must check $webform->getHandlers().
4. The full bad-word list is published to every visitor via drupalSettings in the page source of every webform, anonymous included, by default. That hands evasion-testers the exact list, and many sites won't want their moderation vocabulary readable in source. Needs prominent documentation at minimum; better, make real-time checking server-backed or opt-in.

Moderate

• Multi-value/composite bypass: validateForm() skips any non-string value, so multi-value textfields and composite elements (name, address) are never validated — a trivial bypass. Needs recursive traversal.
• Dead permission: administer webform leetspeak is defined but the settings route requires administer webform instead.
• Variable passed to t(): $this->t($errorMessage, ...) on admin-configured text; only literals should go through t() — use FormattableMarkup for the token replacement.
• Unjustified static calls: the handler comments claim \Drupal:: statics avoid "property redeclaration conflicts with WebformHandlerBase" while using inherited $this->configFactory lines later. There is no conflict; use normal DI via create().
• Performance: findBadWord() re-normalizes every bad word for every word of every field, twice (two passes), in both PHP and JS. Pre-normalize the list once.
• Leftover development narration in shipped code — the normalizer contains "Wait — fuk doesn't match fuck. We collapse then check.", and the settings form ships help tables whose rows are demonstrably wrong (one documents ass→as without noticing that makes the word "as" a false positive). The documentation needs regenerating from tested behaviour.

Minor

• Project machine name (wlsf) ≠ module machine name (webform_leetspeak) — the packaged tarball/composer package will be wlsf with a differently-named module inside; rename one before release.
• LICENSE.txt must not be committed — drupal.org packaging adds it.
• Both README.md and README.txt present with duplicate content; keep one.
• Hard dependency on drupal:language is unnecessary (languageManager() exists in core without it) and forces the module's installation.
• core_version_requirement: ^9 — Drupal 9 is EOL; suggest ^10.3 || ^11.
• JS isExcluded() uses substring matching (excluding name also excludes first_name) while PHP uses exact in_array() — inconsistent semantics.
• Violation logging records client IPs by default — worth a privacy note in the README.
• phpcs: 36 errors / 4 warnings, all auto-fixable with phpcbf.
• No tests and no .gitlab-ci.yml. LeetspeakNormalizer is pure static and trivially unit-testable — a small test suite would have caught every major finding above.

Security

No injection/XSS found: the JS inserts messages via text:, drupalSettings encoding is core-handled, watchdog uses placeholders. The serious concerns are functional and disclosure-related (#3, #4), not classic vulnerabilities.

Summary

Clean intentions and reasonable structure (separate normalizer class, PHP/JS mirror), but the module fails its own advertised examples and false-blocks ordinary English with the shipped defaults — verified by execution. It needs an algorithm redesign, unit tests for the normalizer, scoping of the JS to handler-enabled webforms, and a documentation rewrite before production use.

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Status should be Needs Work after comment #3

1. FILE: README.md

The README file is missing the required sections - Requirements.

2. FILE: README.txt

Remove README.txt since README.md is already prsent.

3. FILE: webform_leetspeak.info.yml

core_version_requirement: ^9 || ^10 || ^11

Projects used for these applications should not declare itself compatible with a Drupal release that is no longer supported. No site should be using Drupal 8 nor Drupal 9, and people should not be encouraged to use those Drupal releases.

dependencies:
  - drupal:webform

The dependencies follow the format <project name>:<module name>. What used for the Webform module is not correct.

4. FILE: webform_leetspeak.module

For a new module that aims to be compatible with Drupal 10 and Drupal 11, I would rather implement hooks as class methods as described in Support for object oriented hook implementations using autowired services.
It would require increasing the minimum Drupal 10 version supported, but Drupal 10.1 is no longer supported.

5. FILE: src/Form/WebformLeetspeakSettingsForm.php

With Drupal 10 and Drupal 11, there is no longer need to use #default_value for each form element, when the parent class is ConfigFormBase: It is sufficient to use #config_target, as in the following code.

    $form['image_toolkit'] = [
      '#type' => 'radios',
      '#title' => $this->t('Select an image processing toolkit'),
      '#config_target' => 'system.image:toolkit',
      '#options' => [],
    ];

Using that code, it is no longer needed to save the configuration values in the form submission handler: The parent class will take care of that.
For this change, it is necessary to require at least Drupal 10.3, but that is not an issue, since Drupal 10.2.x is no longer supported.

I am changing priority as per Issue priorities.