Problem/Motivation
During the January 26th 2022 'mass drop' of modules as unsupported the 'colorbox_node' module was marked unsupported for security issues, see https://www.drupal.org/node/1580102/revisions/view/9850899/12531683 for confirmation.
A similar named module 'colorbox' was also included during the drops of January 26th see https://www.drupal.org/node/632214/revisions/view/12483569/12531845.
The error was mentioned to and acknowledge by security team members via Slack on February 2nd and February 10th.
I believe this was an honest error due to the large number of modules and having a set of modules similarly named causing no public SA notice to be published.
Since the Security Team has not resolved the situation for the module it appears either a policy on how to handle the situation OR introducing automation with technical lockouts (automate the publishing of the release, marking the module insecure, and publishing the SA notice to not require manual interaction) may be required.
Classifying as Major as it has significant repercussions for consumers of the SA Notice system(not made aware of a security vulnerability, and no SA# assigned) however it has a workaround of using the update feed to see when a release status has changed.
Proposed resolution
Develop a policy on how to publish a missed SA notice and required actions and responsibilities of the security team when made aware of such an error.
Remaining tasks
TBD
User interface changes
TBD
API changes
TBD
Data model changes
TBD
Comments
Comment #2
gregglesCan you suggest a draft of this policy? Are you aware of other policies in the project that cover a similar situation?
I'm not sure that we have policies like this in general.
Comment #3
cmlaraTo my knowledge there is not anywhere else in D.O. that has a policy around this. The SA notice system is somewhat a unique position inside of the D.O. that the content on it is important as a security stream. This is also likely not the sort of policy most organization create until after it has occurred once.
The closest scenario that I have seen on D.O. that compare to this are:
Key questions to ask for writing the policy:
A draft policy:
The security team shall publish a SA for any covered module that has been marked insecure. If the Security Team become aware that an SA notice was not published the Security Team will promptly proceeded to make the SA notice publicly available through all normal publication channels.Using 'promptly' as a placeholder for everything in the range of "immediately" to "the next security release window" based on the question above.
Text to place on the Security advisory process and permissions policy page
Comment #4
mlhess commentedComment #5
gregglesHas this situation come up again?
It seems uncommon enough that more documentation is not warranted.
Comment #6
cmlaraI would suggest that is exactly why this should have documentation. You do not want to be writing your "(Emergency) Response Procedures" in the middle of a situation, you want them documented before the situation so that you "pull the binder off the shelf" and start following what has already been written.
As long as we allow human error as a variable the risk of recurrence is there.
Quick slack search:
https://drupal.slack.com/archives/C5B7P7294/p1723053635495029?thread_ts=...
SA was published to D.O. but not announced to mailing list, not as significant as what started this thread, however it is closely related as it is part of the 'publishing' stage of Drupal Advisories and provides evidence the human error factor is still occurring.
I would have to dig deeper, however part of this has also been that many of us are now scrutinizing the security team's every action and flagging the issues publicly in the #security-team room when faults happen in the release cycle (Failing to publish a release, failing to publish the SA even though its been linked in the room, the SA being released to Composer when its not available on D.O.) etc. This does not mean the issue has disappeared nor is it a reliable solution.